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International environmental law (IEL) seems unable to comprehensively and effectively respond 
to the Anthropocene’s deepening socio-ecological crisis. While there are several reasons for this 
state of affairs, one in particular relates to the argument that IEL lacks higher order, global 
constitutional-type norms that could constrain State sovereignty and the free will of States in their 
relations with the environment. As a contribution to the debate on the effectiveness of IEL in the 
Anthropocene, we seek here for such higher order constitutional norms in the areas of customary 
international law and jus cogens. We conduct the ensuing analysis through the lens of the 
‘normative hierarchy’ and ‘global constitutionalism’ theories of international law and critically 
reflect on the extent to which these norms could play a meaningful role to mediate the human-
environment interface in the Anthropocene. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
We are in the midst of one of the most profound, and potentially fatal, existential crises in 
humanity’s relative short existence on Earth. This crisis, which is of our own making, is vividly 
explicated by the Anthropocene and its imagery. In the Anthropocene, humans as ecological agents 
have changed and continue to change Earth and its natural system, transforming Earth ‘rapidly and 
irreversibly into a state unknown in human experience’.1 As a result of these human-induced 
impacts, the Earth is moving into a critically unstable state, with the Earth system gradually 
becoming less predictable, non-stationary and less harmonious as a result of the global human 
imprint on the biosphere.2 
On the back of the Anthropocene’s imagery, it has further been suggested that humanity 
has already crossed some, and are fast approaching several other, planetary boundaries.3 These 
planetary boundaries determine the self-regulating capacity of the Earth system, otherwise 
understood as biophysical thresholds. The boundary theory seeks to refocus attention on the non-
negotiable planetary preconditions that humanity must respect in order to avoid the risk of 
calamitous Earth system change. As a global environmental change threshold reference 
framework, planetary boundaries are signalling that humanity is entering a so-called ‘unsafe 
operating space’,4 which implies a risk of damaging or catastrophic loss of existing ecosystem 
functions and services across the biosphere.5 Of the nine planetary boundaries,6 it is estimated that 
four have already been crossed, i.e. climate change, genetic diversity, land system change and 
biochemical flows.7 
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The Anthropocene and its related image of planetary boundaries could have myriad far-
reaching, but underexplored, epistemological, ontological and normative implications for 
international environmental law (IEL), which still remains the most comprehensive body of law 
encapsulating all post-national norms that seek to mediate the human-environment interface. As 
the world is searching for new paradigms to understand the causes and consequences of, and to 
design more effective responses to, global socio-ecological decay, the Anthropocene as a trope or 
analytical framework is steadily opening up hitherto epistemological closures, as it were, thereby 
allowing us to revisit and re-envision the age-old normative constructs through which we have 
regulated human behaviour and its impacts on the environment to date. To this end, Stephens 
correctly points out that ‘most accounts of international environmental law have yet to come to 
grips with the immense consequences that the Anthropocene poses for global environmental 
governance’.8 
What seems clear though is that IEL is generally perceived to be unable to comprehensively 
and effectively respond to the Anthropocene’s global socio-ecological crisis.9 Some even opine 
that this body of law has contributed to causing, and still actively perpetuates, Anthropocene-
inducing events that are pushing humanity across planetary boundaries.10 IEL is believed, among 
many other considerations, to grant too much latitude to State sovereignty while ineffectively 
sanctioning States’ non-compliance with their obligations under IEL.11 The inefficacy of IEL is 
supposedly not as a result of a lack of norms: 
 
global environmental conditions have continued to deteriorate despite the accumulating 
body of international environmental law … over 700 multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) have been adopted since 1857. However, during this period, the rate 
of anthropogenic global environmental change has been accelerating.12 
 
Clearly alternative and more radical ways must be found to address the most pressing areas 
of concern that impact the effectiveness of IEL if we were to more effectively respond to the 
multiple existing and growing socio-ecological challenges of the Anthropocene. 
One such alternative could lie in the constitutionalism paradigm, which, understood from 
a domestic perspective, is premised on the idea that certain norms and the obligations they impose 
cannot give way to other obligations. Elevating environmental protection to a constitutional 
concern, and more importantly to a constitutional obligation that cannot give way to other 
obligations, could be an effective strategy to enhance environmental protection by means of law. 
It has, after all, already been shown that domestic constitutional measures, especially 
environmental human rights that are hierarchically superior to other norms, have the potential to 
enhance environmental protection.13 
While constitutional environmental norms clearly exist in domestic constitutions the world 
over, it is a far more complex endeavour to determine their existence in the international legal 
order and to evaluate their potential contribution to global environmental protection. More general 
efforts to find and interrogate global ‘constitutional’ norms occur within the paradigms of 
‘normative hierarchy in international law’ and that of ‘global constitutionalism’. The part of the 
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debate that specifically focuses on the emergence of global environmental constitutional norms 
has only been emerging recently.14 The normative hierarchy theory postulates that certain core 
norms exist that articulate the fundamental values of the international community and that enjoy a 
place at the top of international law’s normative hierarchy. The debate on normative hierarchy is 
a central structural component of the global constitutionalism paradigm,15 which proposes that, 
very much like a domestic constitutional setting, hierarchically superior norms exist in a codified 
or uncodified international constitutional setting which could render some international law norms 
more superior, comprehensive, durable and enforceable. From a Western liberal constitutionalism 
point of view, global constitutionalism emphasizes the potential of constitutionalism to achieve a 
good and/or more effective global law and governance order in that it aims ‘to guarantee a political 
[and socio-juridical] process that brings about sustainable and fair compromises between diverging 
interests’.16 It could do so by restricting arbitrary rule of global powers through a global-type 
constitution containing a set of higher order norms and in a related sense to ‘softening’ the 
sovereignty of States and restricting their unilateral actions through the limits imposed by higher 
order norms encapsulated in customary international law (CIL) or jus cogens norms, for example. 
The crux of the global constitutionalism argument is that the higher a norm is located on 
international law’s hierarchy, the stronger it is and the greater potential it has to be observed by 
States and to be enforced against States, not only in relation to global humanitarian, peace or 
human rights issues, but increasingly also environmental concerns, where it would then manifest 
as global environmental constitutionalism. The question we raise in this article is: to what extent 
are CIL and jus cogens norms recognized as binding higher order global constitutional norms that 
could contribute to constraining State sovereignty and the free will of States as far as the 
environment is concerned? The added value in practice of viewing certain environmental norms 
as being of a global constitutional nature, lies in the consideration that such norms could elevate 
environmental protection to a superior normative position on par with other (not entirely unrelated) 
pressing concerns of the international community that are juridically protected, such as 
safeguarding human dignity and maintaining peace.  
To this end, the original contribution of this article lies in its attempt to offer an assessment 
of the CIL and jus cogens status of a selection of some major IEL norms, with a view to 
interrogating whether these norms could be said to form part of a global constitutional regime for 
environmental protection in the Anthropocene. In doing so, the article situates the discussion on 
normative hierarchy within the context of global environmental constitutionalism and that of the 
Anthropocene narrative; formulates the broad outlines of the notion of global environmental 
constitutionalism; and identifies and interrogates a set of higher order global environmental 
constitutional norms that might form part of a tentatively emerging, yet disaggregated, global 
environmental constitution for the Anthropocene. The discussion commences by briefly 
interrogating in Section 2 the normative hierarchy theory and the global environmental 
constitutionalism paradigm, as well as the interrelationship between these concepts. The article 
then investigates in Section 3 whether higher order ‘constitutional’ environmental CIL norms exist 
which could form part of a global environmental constitutional regime. Part 4 focuses on whether 
environmental jus cogens norms exist which, being non-derogable or peremptory, would be 
situated at the apex of IEL’s normative hierarchy. In the concluding Section 5 we offer brief views 
on the potential of constitutional type environmental CIL and jus cogens norms to play a 
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meaningful role as part of the post-State body of environmental laws that mediate the human-
environment interface in the Anthropocene. 
 
2 NORMATIVE HIERARCHY IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
Domestic legal systems are clearly hierarchical in nature. The vertical hierarchy in these systems 
is mostly as a result of constitutions and their provisions which are considered apex law that all 
other laws are subject to.17 The same cannot necessarily be said of the system of international law, 
however, mostly because international law operates mostly horizontally at a different level (post-
State), between different subjects (States), and it addresses interstate global regulatory concerns 
as opposed to localized concerns. Most importantly for present purposes, it is unclear whether 
international law, or some of its aspects and norms, could be described ‘constitutional’ in any 
broad sense in the same way one would normatively characterize the legal system of a domestic 
constitutional State. This is an important consideration because of the fundamental primacy of a 
constitution in any legal order, which is ‘the sum of basic (materially most important) legal norms 
which comprehensively regulate the social and political life of a polity’,18 thereby providing the 
foundation of a legal order, establishing the trias politica of the State and providing the basis and 
legitimacy for law, politics and legality.19 It is also an important consideration in the context of 
international law to the extent that the notion of constitutionalism could be employed to argue for 
more effective, universally binding, and higher-order international law norms that bind States 
regardless of their consent to such norms. 
Considering therefore the preeminence of constitutionalism in domestic legal orders and 
the associated notions of stability and good rule it generally imparts, it seems almost intuitive to 
also search for traces of constitutionalism in the international legal order. Because constitutional 
law mostly establishes a normative hierarchy to the extent that it creates binding apex legal norms, 
it is perhaps no surprise that the constitutionalism debate in international law reflects to a 
considerable extent on the issue of normative hierarchy. International lawyers have for many years 
debated the existence, nature and purpose of a normative hierarchy in international law;20  a debate 
which was sparked by the emergence of the concept of jus cogens norms through Article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).21 This discussion predominantly occurs in the 
context of the global constitutionalism paradigm, which seeks traces of constitutionalism in the 
corridors of international law. With a view to tracing the main threads of this debate, this part 
briefly reflects on the notions of global constitutionalism and its specific environment-related 
manifestation of global environmental constitutionalism. The discussion then focuses on the notion 
of normative hierarchy with a view to establishing if a hierarchy of norms exists in international 
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law generally and with a view to illustrating why normative hierarchy is useful from a global 
environmental constitutional point of view. 
 
2.1 Global constitutionalism 
 
Global constitutionalism derives its core meaning from the notion of a constitution or 
constitutionalism in a domestic context. While no direct transplantation in a notional or normative 
sense of domestic constitutionalism to the global sphere is possible, at least not in any unqualified 
way, it is more likely that core domestic constitutional ideas, norms and/or features could be more 
or less replicated in the global sphere. Because the totality of the State is not absolute any longer, 
the modernist idea that constitutionalism can and should only manifest in domestic, State-bound 
terms are gradually giving way to alternative understandings of constitutionalism’s potential 
relevance and application that reaches beyond the State.22 The shift between the world order as we 
knew it and the considerably more complex globalized world of today, has manifold implications 
for constitutionalism, not least because State-bound constitutional endeavours ‘were operational 
answers to their times and societies and cannot claim eternal truth’.23 This realization supports the 
claim that the terms ‘constitution’ and ‘constitutionalism’, while historically State-bound, arguably 
cannot continue to operate only within the exclusive purview of the nation State; they should and 
are now loosening up in ways that are going beyond the State:24 ‘an exclusive focus of 
constitutionalism on the Nation State cannot be maintained. It needs to give way to a graduated 
approach which views constitutionalism as a process, extending constitutional structures to fora 
and layers of governance other than nations’.25 
Efforts that seek constitutionalism in the global regulatory space manifest clearly, and 
arguably most intuitively, in the arguments of those suggesting that international law and its 
governance institutions have become, or are becoming, constitutionalized. Commentators 
belonging to this predominantly European, and mostly German, influenced school of thought, 
include Peters, Habermas, Fassbender, Simma, Tomuschat, Von Bogdandy and De Wet.26 Some 
general claims around which these commentators fashion their respective visions of global 
constitutionalism include:27 there is a global government organized around the United Nations 
(UN) and its institutions with the Charter of the UN serving as its formal, constituting global 
constitution; there is a discernable international community acting as a constituent power; and an 
international ‘Bill of Rights’ exists (consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights), which is similar to a domestic bill of rights that contain elevated 
human rights norms and obligations based on universal values that supersede other ‘inferior’ 
norms.28 
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Such an approach to global constitutionalism focuses on establishing the autonomy and 
authority of international law vis-à-vis State sovereignty and State consent.29 At a more practical 
level it is also about establishing international legal unity as a response to law and governance 
fragmentation, and perhaps more deliberately, albeit less likely, a global legal integration of States 
and the creation of a fully representative and comprehensive body of international law.30 This 
approach further describes a global constitutional phenomenon both in terms of formal structure 
(allocation of competencies and the delineation of spheres of jurisdiction in the international 
community) and substance (the existence of higher-order norms that must be respected because as 
apex norms they are considered constitutional).31 Especially in terms of the ‘new’ substance of law 
that this approach foresees, international law, and by implication global governance, ‘can no longer 
be understood as a neutral, value-free inter-State order, a mere emanation of State interest’.32 
Through global constitutionalism, material constraints are instead placed on State consent and 
State actions through universally binding apex norms while sovereign interests that run counter to 
the higher order substance of international law are diluted to some extent through these 
‘constitutionally’ binding norms of international law. 
 
2.2 Global environmental constitutionalism 
 
At the domestic level, the reach and relevance of constitutionalism has been extended into the 
environmental law and governance domain; a process which at once also invites environmentalism 
into the constitutionalism domain. This is occurring on the back of growing recognition of the need 
for constitutional norms, institutions, structures and processes to embrace environmental care. 
Whereas some have called for ‘a wider range of options [and] a new paradigm’33 in this respect, 
others suggest that in addition to legitimacy, constitutional review, democracy, accountable 
government and respect for human rights, ‘the constitutionalism of the future’ must as a result of 
contemporary threats and challenges such as climate change, embrace notions of human solidarity 
for the preservation of the planet and its resources and equitable principles in the allocation of 
scarce resources within countries and between people.34 
While there is now an abundance of environmental provisions in constitutions the world 
over, there is still no generally endorsed definition of the concept ‘environmental 
constitutionalism’ as it manifests domestically. The main reason is arguably because it has only 
recently emerged conceptually: 
 
Environmental constitutionalism is a relatively recent phenomenon at the confluence of 
constitutional law, international law, human rights and environmental law. It embodies 
the recognition that the environment is a proper subject for protection in constitutional 
texts and for vindication by constitutional courts worldwide.35 
 
One approach to explaining environmental constitutionalism is to distinguish its 
evaluative, formal or descriptive functions, from its (arguably more important) functional, 
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prescriptive or substantively constitutional functions.36 Whereas formal environmental 
constitutionalism relates to constitutional law establishing, defining and organizing the main 
organs of government, its functions and its powers, including of course the powers of 
environmental authorities, substantive environmental constitutionalism relates to constitutional 
environmental provisions being substantively constitutional, i.e. superior constitutional 
environmental provisions that are justiciable, entrenched and that express a common ideology such 
as through environmental rights. To this end, environmental constitutionalism denotes a regulatory 
paradigm that seeks to enhance environmental protection by elevating it as a constitutional concern 
alongside other pertinent (and often related) regulatory issues such as protection of human dignity 
and freedoms, poverty alleviation and broader human rights protection. Environmental 
constitutionalism in a procedural and substantive sense, therefore establishes State environmental 
authorities that must execute environmental law and governance, while at once creating binding 
apex constitutional norms, such as environmental rights, aimed at environmental protection.37 
With scholars commencing to explore what constitutional environmental protection could 
mean in post-State terms, global constitutionalism has only recently been situated in the 
environmental law and governance domain. That it is critical to instigate such an exploratory 
exercise is evident from Bosselmann’s view that: 
 
we can think of the environment as a universal concern. Arguably, the environment is 
even more fundamental than human rights as it represents the natural conditions of all 
life including human beings. Both the protection of human rights and the protection of 
the environment are constitutionally relevant precisely because of their fundamental 
importance …. If we accept that the twenty-first century will be defined by its success or 
failure of protecting human rights and the environment, then global environmental 
constitutionalism, like global constitutionalism in general, becomes a matter of great 
urgency.38 
 
While domestic environmental constitutionalism is a familiar paradigm that could provide 
a blueprint for global environmental constitutionalism, global environmental constitutionalism 
could enable the State to extend its environmental governance functions to the global regulatory 
space beyond its borders and sphere of direct influence and control, to a space where its abilities 
and influence are far more tentative, but no less important. To this end, one of the many reasons 
for pursuing the global constitutionalism agenda and transposing domestic conceptions of 
constitutionalism globally to the environmental context is to enable States to benefit from the 
advantages of environmental constitutionalism as a response to the socio-ecological challenges 
that arise in the Anthropocene. These advantages include that global environmental 
constitutionalism could: provide higher-order juridical guarantees and care in IEL; fundamentally 
shape and determine environmental law regimes such as those in MEAs, including the level of 
environmental care they espouse; foster greater global coordination and cooperation between like-
minded actors in global environmental law and governance that aspire to promote and respect 
commonly agreed upon core environmental values; guarantee longer lasting environmental 
protection that transcends political short-termism; increase environmental awareness and social 
involvement; and level the playing field by affording environmental considerations the same, if 
not greater, status than pure economic developmental concerns in global law, politics and 
governance.39 It is precisely in this context that the practical value of global environmental 
constitutionalism becomes evident. 
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Most importantly for our present purposes, substantive global environmental 
constitutionalism seeks, among others, for normatively higher-order environmental protection 
norms in IEL, in very much the same way that environmental human rights are entrenched in 
domestic constitutions as apex legal norms. To this end, substantive global environmental 
constitutionalism attempts to serve as a reform measure to the current global environmental law 
and governance regime to limit State sovereignty and discourage States’ non-compliance with their 
environmental obligations through norms that are binding on States despite their lack of consent 
or even in the face of States’ deliberate transgressions of binding IEL. Given their universally 
binding character that does not depend on State consent, the two most likely type of norms to fulfil 
this role are CIL and jus cogens. The following section explores the dimensions and meaning of 
the concept ‘normative hierarchy’, which provides the context for a deeper analysis in the 
remainder of this article of those norms that are situated at the top of IEL’s normative hierarchy. 
 
2.3 Normative hierarchy 
 
In general terms, normative hierarchy refers to the relationship between and ordering of legal 
norms according to their superiority in terms of their objectives, importance of their content, as 
well as the universal acceptance of their superiority.40 Normative hierarchy thus posits the 
existence of a set of orderly, coherently organized norms, and that it is possible to establish from 
their position in the hierarchy whether they are superior or inferior norms in law.41 It should be 
reasonably easy to determine such a hierarchy in vertically operative domestic legal systems, 
which are generally accepted as being hierarchical in nature,42 especially because a constitution 
usually provides superior norms that prevail over all other (statutory and other) norms. In addition, 
there is often a hierarchy within constitutions themselves, with human rights as apex norms.43 
Could such a hierarchical setting also exist in the horizontally oriented international legal 
system?44 While there is no consensus on the nature and form of a normative hierarchy in 
international law, it could be argued that any determination of such a hierarchy must contemplate 
at least three considerations. First, a norm acquires hierarchical superiority because of its value.45 
This was confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Barcelona Traction46 case 
when it used the words ‘importance of the rights involved’ in addressing obligations erga omnes.47 
It is argued that ‘value’ in this context relates to the worth that a certain norm adds to individual 
human welfare,48 which might explain why human rights are often considered apex norms, also in 
international law. 
Second, it can be argued that the function of a norm also determines its hierarchical 
superiority.49 Norms that are non-derogable and serve to limit State sovereignty are therefore 
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usually considered to be superior to other ‘lesser’ norms simply because they have the paramount 
importance of trying to protect the most basic universal values (such as life and human dignity).50 
In this sense, it is argued that hierarchical norms appear as a ‘result of accommodating competing 
values’,51 while at once affording some fundamental norms greater superiority than others. 
The third feature of a normative hierarchy in international law is that hierarchically superior 
norms are seen to be based on the interests of the international community as a whole.52 The 
international community of States can be defined as a collective which has the ability to ‘frame 
and direct political power in light of common values and a common good’.53 The primary subjects 
of the international community are States and their representative international organizations with 
legal personality, which are central to international law making, law enforcement and global 
governance.54 It is argued that the concept of international community entails imposing global 
public policy on all States, including non-consenting States, to limit their freedom of action where 
this is necessary to promote the common good of everyone.55 This could be done through apex 
norms of international law, such as those embodied in the so-called International Bill of Rights  
(referred to above) that reflect the international value system,56 that have a strong ethical 
underpinning and which States are required to incorporate into their domestic systems.57 This value 
system entails the fundamental rules that States have high regard for and that protect, for example, 
the rights to life and human dignity.58 
In sum, a normative hierarchy in international law can be argued to mean the systematic 
ordering of legal norms according to their importance. Such importance depends on the values of 
the international community, the function of the norms, and their recognition by the international 
community as superior norms, with some higher-order ‘constitutional’ and binding norms taking 
precedence over ordinary or lesser non-binding norms. Although there is general agreement that a 
normative hierarchy exists in international law, the form, function and nature of such a hierarchy 
are not always clear: 
 
Public international law, although mostly composed of co-equal norms, shows some 
elements of hierarchy. At the top of this hierarchy, norms of ius cogens and obligations 
erga omnes are of a higher legal quality than the mass of ordinary norms. At its bottom, 
in the grey area between international ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’, are an ever-growing 
number of amorphous ‘concepts’ and ‘principles’, whose nature and normative quality 
are far from clear.59 
 
Several considerations point to the existence of such a hierarchy. First, Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) suggests that the sources of international 
law are not on equal normative footing.60 The ICJ Statute, for example, refers to judicial decisions 
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and academic writings as ‘subsidiary sources of law’.61 By definition, ‘subsidiary’ means that 
judicial decisions and academic writings are additional and therefore possibly inferior to treaties, 
international custom and general principles of law. 
Such reasoning is in line with the second consideration of a normative hierarchy in 
international law, which is the existence of soft law.62 Soft law consists of rules that are neither 
binding in nature nor completely lacking in legal significance.63 These include, for example, 
guidelines, action plans, resolutions, policy declarations and codes of conduct. The Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development64 and Agenda 2165 are examples of soft law 
instruments in IEL. Since soft law is not legally binding, it is therefore inferior to legally binding 
norms such as MEAs, CIL and jus cogens norms. 
Third, States may explicitly create norm hierarchies themselves by articulating such 
hierarchies in the instruments of international law. For example, Article 103 of the UN Charter66 
provides that in the event of conflict between the obligations of its member States under the Charter 
and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter 
will prevail. The UN Charter thus assumes priority over all and any other treaty arrangements 
between States in the case of conflict between these. The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court67 (ICC Statute) also contains a somewhat similar provision where it sets out the 
hierarchy of norms to be applied in adjudication matters.68 
A fourth consideration is the existence of peremptory norms that have emerged as a result 
of Article 53 VCLT. The International Law Commission (ILC) argues that jus cogens reflects a 
normative hierarchy in international law to the extent that these norms are based on the universally 
endorsed values of the international community.69 For example, the value placed on the protection 
of the fundamental right to life can be argued to have led to the recognition of the prohibition of 
torture and genocide as jus cogens norms.70 Illuminating the relationship between jus cogens 
norms and the normative hierarchy theory, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija71 stated that the prohibition of torture is a jus 
cogens norm because of the ‘importance of the values that it protects’. By virtue of their being 
based on the value system of the international community, jus cogens norms are therefore 
hierarchically superior to all other international law norms. Moreover, jus cogens norms can also 
be argued to be hierarchically superior norms to the extent that they are non-derogable, could 
invalidate norms that are inconsistent with them, and could pre-determine the creation of other 
norms. To this end, jus cogens are supposedly situated at the highest level of the international law 
hierarchy, in very much the same way as human rights are often regarded as being situated at the 
top of the normative hierarchy in domestic constitutional legal orders. We return to this issue in 
greater detail below. 
Despite the valid criticism that could be raised against the abstract nature of normative 
hierarchy and its practical utility in international law, there are several advantages to employing 
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the normative hierarchy approach in international law. The first is to resolve norm conflicts. A 
conflict of norms can be described as a situation whereby there are two conflicting norms and in 
obeying or applying one norm, the other norm is necessarily or possibly violated.72 A normative 
hierarchy could resolve such conflicts through determining which norm is superior to the other in 
terms of content and acceptance by the international community. As such, it can also be argued 
that a normative hierarchy makes adjudication easier in the face of norm conflicts, since a court 
does not need to determine how to construe one rule to conform to another because the apex norm 
will trump all others.73 This could ensure that international law is generally more certain, 
accessible and stable, a situation which has the effect of possibly preventing future norm conflicts 
and further developing international law generally. In the environmental context, it would thus be 
possible to afford a hierarchically superior environmental law norm, and the obligations it imposes, 
precedence if it conflicts with a hierarchically inferior norm that run counter to the environmental 
protection obligations that the former seeks to impose on States. Normative hierarchy is also 
important for the reasons of ‘mode control’74 as it sets out what is lawful and unlawful, applicable 
rights and duties, and whether a State is in conformity or in violation of a norm. This could go a 
long way in clarifying specific environmental obligations of States in terms of binding higher order 
IEL. Further, a normative hierarchy could protect the fundamental values of the international 
community embodied as apex norms. By entrenching and elevating such values, a normative 
hierarchy has the effect of ‘constitutionalizing’ such norms, which will be binding on States despite 
their lack of consent. This could be particularly beneficial to force States to comply with at least 
some of their IEL obligations. We reflect immediately below on the potential of certain CIL and 
jus cogens norms as possible apex norms in IEL’s normative hierarchy to fulfil such a function. 
 
3 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
The purpose of this part is to explore some potential environmental CIL norms to determine 
whether they could form part of the upper echelons of IEL’s normative hierarchy. As highlighted 
earlier, CIL is international law that is binding on the international community as a whole. CIL 
norms have been ‘accepted by States beyond their treaty-law formulations’ and they have binding 
authority ‘over each and every State in the absence of any written legal commitment by them’.75 
To this end, CIL should ideally serve to complement MEA obligations rather than to replace them; 
a notion supported by the ICJ’s acknowledgement in the Case Concerning North Sea Continental 
Shelf76 that under certain conditions, CIL norms may emerge that are identical to treaty obligations. 
The importance of CIL, and its potential advantages for environmental compliance and 
enforcement, are further evident when one considers that many MEAs remain unimplemented or 
only partially implemented; not all States that are concerned with a specific environmental matter 
that an MEA seeks to regulate is part of that particular MEA; and multiple interpretation and 
enforcement challenges are associated with several MEAs, even when they are fully 
implemented.77 At least some of these regulatory deficiencies could be addressed by CIL. 
One potential drawback of CIL, some might argue, is the persistent objector rule, in terms 
of which a State which consistently refuses the existence or applicability of a particular CIL rule 
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will not be bound by that CIL rule.78 Yet, while the persistent objector rule may be seen to provide 
and easy way out for States that attempt to circumvent their binding customary obligations, its 
negative impact on the effectiveness of CIL and the legitimacy of this body of law should not be 
over-stressed. As Dupuy reminds us: 
 
the actual practice of the ‘persistent objector’ is seldom sufficient to protect a dissenting 
State from the compulsory effect of some rules. This is especially the case when the rest 
of the international community is largely in agreement about the binding nature of the 
rule in question. In those cases, a State’s behaviour rarely remains coherent and 
comprehensive enough in the long term to achieve the desired result – that is, of not being 
bound by the rule.79 
 
And even where the persistent objector rule effectively enables a State not to be bound by 
a specific CIL rule, that fact alone would not significantly impact that rule’s relatively elevated 
position in the normative hierarchy in IEL, mainly because of its universally binding status with 
respect to all other States which still remain subject to it. 
Further reflecting on the elevated position of CIL in the normative hierarchy, there is a 
view that ‘[t]reaties rank second [below CIL], since their binding nature rests on the customary 
rule of pacta sunt servanda’;80 although this view should probably be qualified in the sense that 
CIL are merely of more universal application than MEAs. Moreover, while the persistent objector 
rule might render some CIL norms normatively inferior to peremptory jus cogens norms (which 
States can never object to), CIL remains normatively superior to soft law by virtue of CIL’s being 
universally binding without the need for a written law to be ratified. 
A generally endorsed two-pronged test is applied to prove that a specific rule has attained 
CIL status. The first material part of this test requires that there must be State practice (usus) 
showing States’ customary adherence to the rule. State practice is an objective requirement and 
political statements by States, or their mere declaration of the recognition of a rule, do not 
necessarily suffice for the purposes of State practice.81 State practice must rather be widespread 
and repetitive,82 although it can be argued that universal acceptance is not necessary.83 With 
reference to IEL, it is argued that if a particular environmental problem is uniformly regulated in 
a number of MEAs, this may be regarded as evidence of usus.84 The second requirement for a 
norm to attain CIL status is opinio juris (or the intellectual or physiological element), which refers 
to States’ intention to be bound by the norm in question, or their conviction that uniform practice 
is mandatory.85 As such, opinio juris is a subjective requirement which is far more difficult to 
determine than usus (although opinio juris may be implied by usus), because it essentially requires 
evidence of a State’s state of mind; or its conviction.86 
There is still no general consensus on the norms which have CIL status in IEL. The 
following discussion will focus on four norms: the no-harm principle, sustainable development, 
the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle. All four of these usually form the crux 
of most enquiries into the customary international environmental law debate. 
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3.1 No-harm principle 
 
The Permanent Court of International Justice in S.S. Wimbledon87 stressed that State sovereignty 
is not inalienable, meaning it can be limited. Such a viewpoint is exemplified by the no-harm 
principle, which first emerged in an environmental context in the Trail Smelter Arbitration,88 in 
which it was held that no State may use its territory in a way that causes harm to the territory of 
another State. Transboundary environmental harm usually takes three forms: air pollution, the 
transboundary movement of hazardous waste and the pollution of a transboundary environmental 
resource such as watercourses.89 It is probably correct to say that the no-harm principle does not 
absolutely prohibit all and any transboundary harm: it simply suggests an obligation on States to 
exercise due diligence in their relations with one another that could cause transboundary harm.90 
State practice and opinio juris for the no-harm principle are reflected by the principle’s 
subsequent codification in a number of soft law instruments and MEAs and recognition by 
international courts. After its recognition in Trail Smelter, the no-harm principle was included in 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which specifies States have ‘the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment 
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’. The no-harm principle was 
also subsequently included as Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. Although not binding, these soft 
law instruments reflect the opinion of the majority of States and the widespread acceptance of the 
no-harm principle. The no-harm principle is also recognized in a number of MEAs such as the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD).91 
The ICJ has endorsed the no-harm principle on a number of occasions. In the Corfu 
Channel case,92 for example, the Court held that a State may not knowingly allow its territory to 
be used to injure another State. Other judicial bodies such as the Arbitral Tribunal in the Lake 
Lanoux Arbitration93 stated that where a shared resource is concerned, a State must take the 
interests of other States into account before engaging in an activity which may cause harm to 
others. The no-harm principle has also been endorsed through the codification work of the ILC,94 
and in declarations and resolutions adopted by the United Nations,95 and other international 
organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).96 
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Consequently, there seems to be general consensus that the no-harm principle has attained CIL 
status.97 
It is often argued that the duty to conduct a transboundary environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) under certain circumstances has also attained CIL status, notably to the extent that this duty 
is seen to be part of the no-harm principle.98 The duty to conduct a transboundary EIA involves an 
evaluation by a State of the likely impact of a proposed activity on the environment.99 This duty is 
enshrined, among others, in Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration, the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, and the US-Canada Air Quality Agreement,100 and it surfaces in article 7 
of the ILC’s Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm.101 The ICJ has also 
indirectly confirmed the duty to conduct a transboundary EIA in some cases,102 and there seems 
to be sufficient support for including this aspect into the ambit of the no-harm principle.  
 
3.2 Sustainable development 
 
Sustainable development is generally taken to mean development that meets the needs of the 
present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.103 It requires the balancing of environmental, social and economic interests during 
‘development’, broadly conceived. Sustainable development is also concerned with inter- and 
intra-generational equity, which is the balancing of interests between members of this generation 
and between the present and future generations. It is argued that sustainable development is a 
universally accepted notion because of its proliferation in global politics and governance (as the 
adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015 by the United Nations General Assembly 
aptly suggests),104 and more specifically as a cornerstone and guiding principle of IEL.105 
To demonstrate its increasing traction, sustainable development has been included as a 
notion and objective in several MEAs. The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, for example, provide 
that sustainable development is an important objective for combating climate change;106 and States 
‘have a right to, and should promote sustainable development’.107 The United Nations Convention 
to Combat Desertification refers, inter alia, to sustainable economic growth in its preamble as a 
priority of developing countries, whereas the CBD stresses the importance of ‘sustainable use’.108 
Moreover, the ICJ has referred to sustainable development in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case,109 
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emphasizing the interconnectedness of economic development and the protection of the 
environment, although it stopped well short of pronouncing on the normative status of the concept. 
Despite such widespread recognition, it remains unclear whether sustainable development 
is part of soft law, a mere political objective, or whether it has since become a universally binding 
global legal standard to measure conduct that may impact on the environment.110 Proliferation of 
references to sustainable development has arguably only led to confusion rather than clarity of the 
concept, especially because of its being frequently invoked by States in global law, politics and 
governance as a palliative to mean at once everything and nothing at all.111 The general view 
accordingly seems to be that sustainable development has not attained CIL status.112 Despite its 
proliferation, there is little evidence suggesting that there is a widespread and consistent State 
practice promoting sustainable development, while there is even less evidence of opinio juris. That 
we are probably entering the Anthropocene, especially as explicated by the continuing 
deterioration of Earth system integrity, is arguably persuasive evidence that States have altogether 
failed to implement sustainable development consistently in any widespread manner, while 
intending to be bound by its lofty ideals. It is perhaps more accurate to say that sustainable 
development remains a political goal to be reached somewhere in future rather than a norm to 
which present practice must adhere. Moreover, since sustainable development is ambiguous and 
susceptible to various interpretations, it can be argued that it is unfit, for now at least, to be a 
higher-order legal norm which can ‘deploy any appreciable steering effect on States’ 
environmental behaviour’.113 As such, sustainable development can best be described as a non-
binding principle ‘that guides States in their decision-making’,114 and at worst as an ideological 
palliative that is politically loaded, but normatively rather empty.115 
 
3.3 Precautionary principle 
 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration provides for the precautionary principle, which states that the 
lack of scientific certainty regarding an identified environmental risk must not be a reason to 
postpone action that could prevent environmental harm.116 It is essentially a principle for inducing 
States to foresee and avoid or minimize environmental risks. The precautionary principle also 
could help in identifying the general standards for due diligence and the appropriate standard of 
care required for preventing transboundary harm.117 To this end, it has been argued that the 
precautionary principle is possibly related to the duty to conduct a transboundary EIA,118 as 
described earlier, although this does not necessarily mean that the precautionary principle is also 
a CIL norm as a result. 
The precautionary principle has been included in a number of MEAs. For example, the 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol refer to the 
precautionary principle in their preambles.119 The CBD provides in its preamble that where there 
is a threat of loss of biological diversity, the lack of scientific certainty should not be a reason to 
postpone action aimed at avoiding or minimizing such loss. The precautionary principle is also 
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provided in Article 1 of the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol,120 the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe Watercourses Convention,121 and as a guiding principle in Article 3(3) of 
the UNFCCC. Two of the dissenting judges in the Nuclear Tests case referred to the precautionary 
principle as an emerging feature of IEL.122 In the Southern Bluefin Tuna case123 the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea believed that lack of scientific certainty should not be used to 
delay the conservation of the stock of southern Bluefin tuna. The Tribunal did, however, not clarify 
if the precautionary principle could be considered binding CIL. 
It is unlikely at this stage that the precautionary principle could be seen to have achieved 
CIL status, and the predominant view is that it is at best an ‘emerging rule of customary 
international environmental law’.124 Much like sustainable development discussed above, there is 
no clear evidence that the precautionary principle is a command to act which imposes duties on 
States to take definable action.125 Furthermore, international courts have been reluctant to apply 
the principle ‘as a legal yardstick for solving interstate disputes’.126 
 
3.4 Polluter pays principle 
 
In basic terms, the polluter pays principle means that the party responsible for polluting the 
environment must bear the costs of remediating such pollution and/or the costs of preventing and 
controlling such pollution. To this end, the principle aims to regulate pollution, ensure 
environmentally sustainable activities,127 and provide for the ‘most efficient way to allocate costs 
of pollution prevention and control measures’.128 The polluter pays principle was first identified 
in the OECD’s Guiding Principles129 as a method to be used for the allocation of the cost of 
pollution prevention and control, before its inclusion as Principle 16 in the Rio Declaration. 
The polluter pays principle is further recognized in a number of MEAs,130 although its 
application in these instruments varies. In some contexts, such as the Barcelona Convention for 
the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution,131 the principle is ‘represented as cost 
bearing for pollution control, prevention and reduction measures’, which measures are set by 
national authorities or within MEAs.132 In other treaties, States are urged to be ‘guided’ by the 
principle and in yet others ‘to take the principle into account’ or to ‘apply’ it.133 In some contexts, 
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the polluter-pays principle is also recognized as a general principle of IEL,134 and in other contexts 
as an indication of the acceptance of responsibility for pollution.135 Despite such wide recognition, 
the international judiciary has not yet pronounced on the normative qualities of the principle. 
Furthermore, the softened wording in Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration (‘should endeavour to 
promote’) might show that the principle lacks the binding effect of a legal rule.136 There 
accordingly seems to be general agreement that the polluter-pays principle has not achieved CIL 
status yet, although it is recognized as legal rule, mostly in the European regional context.137 
The foregoing discussion illustrates that by their very universally binding nature, CIL 
norms are situated higher up in IEL’s normative hierarchy. While this is potentially advantageous 
insofar as such universally binding norms could compensate for regulatory deficiencies resulting 
especially from MEAs, there is only one environmental norm that has to date been accepted as 
having customary international law status, i.e. the no-harm rule and its associated obligation to 
conduct a transboundary EIA. 
 
4 ENVIRONMENTAL JUS COGENS NORMS 
 
At its most basic, jus cogens is understood as universally imperative, compelling and obligatory 
law (or jus strictum) that sharply contrasts with jus dispositivum (voluntary law which yields to 
the will of the parties).138 Jus cogens norms are compelling to the extent that they are mandatory, 
do not permit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent 
authority (i.e. other jus cogens norms).139 They are universal in that they are seen to have erga 
omnes effect, meaning that they apply to all members of the international community of States, 
even if a State does not consent to a jus cogens rule’s mandatory application.140 An obligation erga 
omnes also gives the rest of the international community an interest in its enforcement, and they 
are obligatory to the extent that they create negative obligations on States to refrain from doing 
something.141 Collectively, these characteristics confirm that there is something inherently 
constitutional about jus cogens norms to the extent that they are considered apex universally 
binding norms of a normative hierarchy in international law.142 
Even though jus cogens norms owe their existence to the VCLT, this treaty does not contain 
any criteria to apply in an effort to determine the existence of specific jus cogens norms. Given the 
lack of guidance in the relevant treaty provisions, the identification and elaboration of specific jus 
cogens norms have been left to States, courts, bodies such as the ILC, and the academe. Although 
there is no universal agreement on this, the rules of international law that are currently accepted as 
having jus cogens status include, among others: the prohibition of the threat or use of force against 
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the territorial integrity or political independence of any State; the prohibition of genocide; the 
prohibition of torture; crimes against humanity; the prohibition of slavery and slave trade; the 
prohibition of piracy; the prohibition of racial discrimination and apartheid; and the prohibition of 
hostilities or force directed at a civilian population.143 Most of the recognized jus cogens norms to 
date are human rights-type norms,144 although Article 64 of the VCLT envisages the creation of 
new peremptory norms of general international law, which, for present purposes might include 
environmental jus cogens norms. 
Based as they are on notions of human rights, jus cogens norms are value-laden and have 
a strong ethical underpinning.145 Arguably, the protection of the values of the international 
community is both the purpose and ‘paramount criterion for jus cogens norms.’146 In Prosecutor 
v Anto Furundzija,147 the ICTY stated that the prohibition of torture is a jus cogens norm because 
of the ‘importance of the values that it protects’. The ICJ in Barcelona Traction148 also held that 
prohibitions on genocide, slavery and racial discrimination should be conferred with peremptory 
erga omnes status because of the ‘importance of the rights involved’. The ILC in the work of the 
Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law149 stated that jus cogens norms become 
hierarchically superior because of the importance of their content as well as the universal 
acceptance of their superiority. As such, the threshold for identifying jus cogens norms is arguably 
high.150 
Jus cogens norms are subject to so called ‘double acceptance’ by the international 
community of States.151 Although there is no formal link between jus cogens and CIL norms, 
States in principle usually first agree to the CIL status of the norm, i.e. usus and opinio juris must 
be proved. The second stage will require States to agree on the non-derogability of the norm in 
question.152 In justifying their finding that the prohibition of torture is a jus cogens norm, the ICJ 
in Belgium v Senegal said that the norm in question has ‘widespread international practice and is 
based on the opinio juris of States’.153 The acceptance of the peremptory character of a norm is 
evidenced by considering the values that such a norm protects and whether the norm has a strong 
ethical underpinning.154 In this view jus cogens norms essentially appear as elevated and distinct 
CIL norms. 
Jus cogens norms are absolute in character, and the non-derogability criterion is both a 
prerequisite and consequence of jus cogens norms.155 This means that States cannot violate any 
jus cogens norm under any circumstances through, among others, treaties, unilateral acts or 
domestic laws.156 The non-derogability of jus cogens norms means that they are binding even on 
States that have objected to the norms.157 To this end, the ICJ has referred to jus cogens norms as 
‘intransgressible principles of international customary law’.158 In Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija,159 
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the ICTY held that the jus cogens norm on the prohibition of torture can never be derogated from, 
even in times of emergency. Relatedly, very much like domestic constitutional provisions and 
norms, jus cogens are onerous to amend or to modify. The modification of a jus cogens norm refers 
to its development, expansion in scope, replacement or abolition.160 It can be argued that since jus 
cogens norms protect the universally shared values of the international community, they cannot be 
easily modified for the purposes of durability and to avoid abuse of power. Therefore, the 
modification of a jus cogens norm arguably also requires that the modification be accepted by the 
international community of States as a whole,161 which of course creates a very high threshold. 
Although there is extensive literature dealing with various general aspects of jus cogens,162 
it has not been the subject of any sustained and thoroughgoing scholarly analysis in the 
environmental domain.163 The most common view is that environmental jus cogens norms do not 
exist, at least not yet. According to Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell: 
 
What cannot be supposed is that environmental rules have any inherent priority over 
others save in the exceptional case of ius cogens norms …. No such norms of international 
environmental law have yet been convincingly identified, nor is there an obvious case for 
treating them in this way.164 
 
Singleton-Cambage agreeing with this, explains that: 
 
Currently, environmental rights and responsibilities are not recognized as having this 
legal status [of jus cogens], despite the fact that global environmental preservation 
represents an essential interest of all individuals within the entire international society. 
Sufficient time has not yet passed to enable environmental issues to evolve to this status 
of international law. The establishment of peremptory norms must develop from a specific 
practice for an extended period of time by the general majority of States.165 
 
While conflict does arise in the environmental law and governance domain as a result of 
the inherently opposing goals of socio-economic development on the one hand and the 
concomitant need for environmental protection on the other (aptly expressed by the principle of 
sustainable development), such conflicts ‘have not led international courts to employ the concept 
of ius cogens or to give human rights, environmental protection or economic development 
automatic priority’.166 Indeed, to date, no MEA has been declared ab initio invalid as a result of 
its or one of its provisions conflicting with a generally accepted jus cogens norm as per Articles 
53 and 64 VCLT. Neither has a treaty nor one of its provisions been declared invalid because it 
contradicted a jus cogens norm on environmental grounds. 
It is therefore unclear which IEL norms could be considered to have peremptory status. 
Based on the broader contextual discussion above, the following part investigates two IEL norms 
that could possibly already be or become jus cogens norms. These norms are the no-harm principle 
and the human right to a healthy environment which seem as the two most likely contenders for 
such a position, for reasons we set out below. 
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4.1 No-harm principle 
 
De Wet suggests that Articles 53 and 64 VCLT provide States sufficient freedom to determine 
themselves what are peremptory norms and what are not.167 As was explained above, in practice 
this would occur through a process that first identifies a norm as CIL and then an agreement on 
whether derogation is permitted from that customary norm or not. An appropriate place therefore 
to start searching for environmental jus cogens norms is in the sphere of already accepted CIL 
environmental norms. We have indicated above that the no-harm principle (and the concomitant 
duty to conduct a transboundary EIA) is arguably the only principle with customary law status in 
IEL. Today the no-harm principle ‘has been so widely accepted in international treaty practice, 
numerous declarations of international organizations, the codification work of the ILC, and in the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ that it can be considered to be a customary substantive rule at the universal 
level’.168 It should thus easily satisfy the first stage of acceptance. 
Whether it has attained the status of a norm from which no derogation is permitted (the 
second stage of acceptance) is, however, debatable. It is still unlikely that States have universally 
accepted any ‘strong ethical [ecological] underpinning’169 that should be associated with the no-
harm principle. Yet, because of its customary status and that it imposes negative obligations, 
suggest that at least theoretically, it has the potential to become a peremptory norm in future. 
Moreover, considered in the light of the Anthropocene and fast approaching planetary boundaries, 
and their implicit ethical implications to desist from causing irreversible socio-ecological harm, 
there is increasing motivation auguring support for universal recognition of the no-harm rule’s 
potential peremptory character with a view to exercising greater global socio-ecological care by 
States.170 
 
4.2 The human right to a healthy environment 
 
Broadening jus cogens norms into the environmental domain can also be accomplished through 
human rights, especially if one agrees with the broader contention that existing jus cogens norms 
have a strong human rights underpinning, as most do. To date, there is neither a globally 
recognized international right to a healthy environment, nor an international human rights treaty 
which provides for an enforceable substantive right to a healthy environment.171 The majority of 
domestic constitutions, however, now recognize the right to a healthy environment in one form or 
another, while regionally the right is also entrenched in various human rights instruments.172 Yet, 
despite such widespread recognition, there is little evidence suggesting that the right to a healthy 
environment has already achieved the status of CIL. There is accordingly little chance of the right 
to a healthy environment attaining jus cogens status by evolving from an established CIL basis 
through the method of double acceptance discussed above. 
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It is, however, more likely that environment-related human rights interests could be 
protected through and by means of other human rights-based jus cogens norms. To the extent that 
human rights concerns in the environmental domain significantly overlap with other human rights 
issues, as is generally the case, it could be possible to argue that the remit of ‘traditional’ jus cogens 
norms related to, for example, the prohibition against apartheid (which per implication includes 
human rights issues such as the right to life, dignity and equality) should be expanded to include 
environmental considerations as well. After all, a degraded environment adversely impacts human 
dignity and the quality of life of people as the South African example of apartheid shows by means 
of which black South Africans have been relocated to live in so-called townships situated close to 
industries without any meaningful provision of water, waste and sanitation services. In his 
Separate Opinion in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros judgment, Judge Weeramantry emphasized that 
the protection of the environment is important for the enjoyment of other human rights.173 For 
example, the right to life, which is considered to be a jus cogens norm,174 is enshrined in virtually 
every human rights convention,175 including, among others, in the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights,176 and it is a non-derogable right 
even in times of emergency.177 It could be argued that the destruction of life-sustaining 
environmental conditions directly and/or indirectly could violate the right to life.178 Through such 
a construction it would be possible to extend the peremptory obligation of the rights to life to 
encapsulate environmental protection, notably to the extent that such environmental protection is 
crucially necessary for the protection of life and preservation of human dignity. 
On the foregoing account, we must conclude that currently, no explicit environmental jus 
cogens norms exist. There is, however, some scope for such rules to develop over time through 
existing CIL and through the global human rights agenda. The development of environmental jus 
cogens norms should, in our view, be a priority since their absence potentially mutes the prospects 
of creating a solid set of apex peremptory global environmental constitutional norms at the top of 
IEL’s normative hierarchy that aim to secure more effective environmental care in the 
Anthropocene. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
In this article, we investigated whether constitutional IEL norms exist thought the lens of global 
(environmental) constitutionalism and the theory of normative hierarchy. We situated the 
discussion against the backdrop of the Anthropocene trope with a view to highlighting the urgency 
of the debate and to emphasizing the need to create constitutional IEL norms that could contribute 
to addressing the ever-deepening socio-ecological crisis explicated by the Anthropocene. We first 
explained what is meant by the concepts of global constitutionalism, global environmental 
constitutionalism and normative hierarchy in international law, including a reflection on their 
relationship. We then sought to identify higher-order constitutional IEL norms by focusing 
specifically on CIL and jus cogens norms. 
Our central hypothesis has been that the Anthropocene and its associated imagery of 
planetary boundaries require far more drastic universal (and preferably non-derogable) norms that 
bind States to their environmental protection obligations flowing from these norms, regardless of 
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whether they have agreed to these norms and their associated obligations. Looking for such norms 
that are situated at the top of IEL’s hierarchy could potentially address some of the shortcomings 
and regulatory gaps of IEL, especially if one agrees with the view that ‘the very structure of the 
international legal order is found to be wanting and consequently alternatives, however inchoate, 
must be considered’.179 
The ‘alternatives’ that the Anthropocene requires is a ‘fundamental reorientation and 
restructuring of national and international [law and governance] institutions toward more effective 
Earth system governance and planetary stewardship’.180 Plainly, our legal institutions must play a 
crucial role in changing the type and severity of human impacts that are leading to the present and 
predicted future encroachments on Earth system integrity. This must entail a dramatic rethink of 
IEL’s composition, purpose and scope; which, perhaps inevitably, will have to occur also within 
the context of constitutionalism as we have argued above. Thus, if CIL and jus cogens are accepted 
to constitute some form of minimum global constitutional threshold of an international value 
system to which the international community of States is subjected to,181 then this international 
value system will have to be expanded to include notions of environmental care that are situated 
at the constitutional apex of IEL’s normative hierarchy, if we were to contribute juridically to 
countering Anthropocene exigencies. 
Our analysis suggests that the status quo with respect to those apex constitutional norms 
situated at the top of IEL’s normative hierarchy is a mixed bag. Very few such norms currently 
exist. The no-harm principle, which includes the duty to conduct a transboundary EIA, is to date 
the only generally accepted customary environmental law norm. While the precautionary 
principle, the polluter-pays principle and the principle of sustainable development are arguably not 
CIL norms yet, they have the potential to become CIL over time which could significantly 
contribute to enhancing the superior normative force of some of IEL’s norms. For this to happen, 
we would need to see a far more deliberate effort by States that clearly demonstrates their intention 
to be bound by these norms, including their intention to act within the normative boundaries set 
out by the environmental obligations imposed by the norms. 
We also demonstrated that no explicit environmental jus cogens norms exist to date. The 
only potential for the development of an environmental jus cogens norm would be if States were 
to eventually recognize the peremptory nature of the no-harm principle, which, considering the 
slow development of customary environmental law norms, is unlikely to occur anytime soon. Until 
that happens, it is more likely that the normative force of peremptory norms could be extended 
into the environmental domain through human rights constructions, and specifically by addressing 
environmental protection through those environmentally incidental human rights norms that are 
currently recognized as having jus cogens status. While it would be far more preferable if explicitly 
clear environmental jus cogens norms were to be created, we believe using incidental human rights 
norms for environmental protection holds considerable potential in the short term. States, global 
judicial institutions such as the ICJ, and global civil society, if they do take their socio-ecological 
obligations seriously in the Anthropocene, must embark as soon as possible on utilizing this 
possibility. 
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